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Can Bundled Discounting
Increase Consumer Prices
Without Excluding Rivals?
Daniel A. Crane & Joshua D. Wright*
I. Introduction
Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No.
As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers
unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby
permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corol-
lary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive
and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of exclud-
ing rivals.1
We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of
Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the subject of this sympo-
sium.2 In Section VI, Professor Elhauge argues that bundled discounting can have
“power effects” identical to conventional tying arrangements irrespective of any
exclusionary effect on rivals as well as that cost/revenue tests for bundled dis-
counting perversely immunize the worst bundled discounting schemes—those
that represent the highest non-exclusionary price increases to consumers.
We disagree with Professor Elhauge on these propositions, as we do on many
of the earlier arguments in his draft. At a later date, we will offer a fuller response
to his arguments and a qualified defense of a “neo-Chicago” perspective on
monopoly leverage, price discrimination, and bundled discounting. Qualified,
because we do not believe that monopoly leverage is impossible, that price dis-
crimination is always efficiency-enhancing, or that bundled discounts can never
exclude competitors or harm consumers. Rather, we believe that if Chicago over-
stated its case on each of these points, post-Chicago has far overstated its case on
*Daniel Crane is Professor of Law, University of Michigan and Joshua Wright is Professor, George Mason
University School of Law and Department of Economics.
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each of these points. Indeed, the best available empirical evidence suggests the
frequency of instances of bundled discounts and tying arrangements resulting in
harm to consumers as compared to those arrangements improving consumer wel-
fare is very low.3 Particularly, we believe that:
1. The conditions necessary for monopoly leveraging through tying are
narrow and rarely exhibited in real markets and, thus, we should con-
tinue to be presumptively skeptical
about leverage claims. Further, the
theoretical analyses of anticompetitive
bundling, tying, and bundled discounts
contain highly stylized and restrictive
assumptions, assume away efficiency
benefits of these practices, and have
not generated testable hypotheses sup-
ported by empirical tests.
2. The conditions necessary for price dis-
crimination through tie-ins to be out-
put-reducing are rarely exhibited in
real markets. Price discrimination
should be thought of as competitively
neutral in static efficiency terms and frequently, but not always, com-
petitively beneficial in dynamic efficiency terms. More precisely, and
contrary to Professor Elhauge’s analysis, price discrimination’s effects
on both static total- and static consumer-welfare are generally ambigu-
ous depending on market conditions. When one takes into account
the incentives for price discrimination to intensify price competition
and dynamic efficiencies such as the incentive to innovate and offer
new products, it becomes clear that sound antitrust policy should view
price discrimination as a legitimate and normal part of the competi-
tive process.4
3. Bundled discounts only rarely partake of the qualities of tie-ins and
they should generally enjoy legal protection unless they are predatory.
For the purposes of this symposium, we tackle only the last of these proposi-
tions. In brief, we argue that Elhauge’s “power effects” thesis as to bundled dis-
counts rests on a faulty premise—that the monopolist is free to threaten an
unlimited price on the monopoly item in the bundle and, consequently, can
charge a higher price for the bundle than it could for sales of the goods individ-
ually. To the contrary, since a rational monopolist will already have charged the
profit-maximizing monopoly price on the monopoly item, its threat to charge a
higher price unless the customer accedes to a bundled discount demand is hol-
low. Execution of such a threat would harm the monopolist, and harm it consid-
erably more than the opposite predatory strategy of cutting prices.
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While there may be a few examples of such strategies in the real world, we are
skeptical that such strategies occur frequently enough to organize legal rules
around them. The economics literature and available evidence supports our
skepticism. Bundled discounting law should focus on the paradigmatic threat—
that a bundled discounting package will exclude rivals and thereby increase the
defendant’s monopoly power.
II. Bundled Discounts as Tie-Ins
A practice ostensibly related to tying that has received much attention in the last
decade is bundled discounting—where the dominant firm offers customers a dis-
count if they choose to purchase a package of goods or services.5 There is present-
ly a circuit split over how antitrust law should evaluate such discounts. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit treats them as akin to tying or exclusive
dealing arrangements.6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit treats
them as akin to predatory pricing, subject to a discount attribution rule.7
Bundled discounts differ nominally from tie-ins insofar as they offer the buyer
a choice of either buying the competitive or monopoly products. The Supreme
Court has suggested that the offering of the option to buy the two goods unbun-
dled defeats a tying claim, even if the two goods are offered jointly at a lower
price.8 Still, courts have sensibly recognized that the seller’s offer to sell the goods
unbundled could be a sham concealing a de
facto tying arrangement if the unbundled price
was set so high that it would not be economical-
ly rational for any customer to accept it.9
However, when a significant number of buy-
ers choose to disregard the discount offer and
instead purchase the goods individually, it is
unlikely that the discount offer is coercive. The
volume of the Areeda-Turner treatise on which
Elhauge was a co-editor suggests, as a rule of thumb, that only “separate sales
[falling] below ten percent presumptively indicate a de facto tie.”10 The treatise
further suggests that when separate sales are above ten percent, the package dis-
count should not be treated as tying at all and that the defendant should not be
required to justify the discount as cost-justified.11
In his current draft, Elhauge rejects the Treatise’s position and proposes a new
test that would treat non-exclusionary bundled discounts as unlawful tie-ins
under specified circumstances. Elhauge would condemn as an unlawful tie those
bundled discount offers where the defendant has market power over the “linking
product,” the “unbundled price for the linking product exceeds the but-for level,”
and the defendant cannot offer an offsetting efficiency justification.12
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As an initial matter, we are very skeptical that identifying the “but-for” price
of the linking, i.e., monopoly, product will be feasible in most cases. Elhauge
admits the “determining the but-for price can be difficult,” but asserts—without
citing any examples—that internal business documents or regression analyses
will often provide evidence of the but-for price.13 There are many problems with
Elhauge’s suggestion.
For one, Elhauge assumes a clean before-and-after story where the defendant
used to engage in only single-product pricing and then moved to a bundled dis-
count scheme. In our experience, bundled discounts stories are usually far more
dynamic than that simplistic two-stage analysis,
with constantly shifting pricing and discounting
structures, product innovation, cost changes,
and industry dynamics making it impossible to
determine clean before-and-after figures.
Further, the search for the but-for price is
bound to run into the difficulty that, as both
Elhauge and Chicago School scholars believe,
bundled discounts often produce price discrimi-
natory effects. A seller with a monopoly over the
linking product will often have engaged in some price discrimination even prior
to initiating a bundled discount program and will probably do so afterwards. The
aggrieved plaintiff may very well be the loser in the shift from a less-efficient to
more-efficient price discrimination scheme. From the plaintiff ’s perspective, the
shift may appear to raise prices in the linking product even though average prices
fall. It would be anomalous to allow the individual plaintiff ’s idiosyncratic expe-
rience to determine the legality of the discount, but proving the effect on aver-
age prices across all buyers may be impossible.
In any event, Elhauge’s assumption that dominant firms will be able to
increase the linked product price over the but-for price rests on a faulty premise.
He asserts that “[b]ecause the defendant is free to set the noncompliant prices at
whatever level it wishes, it can set them above the levels that would have pre-
vailed ‘but for’ the bundling.”14 Thus, Elhauge argues, a package price that nom-
inally offers discounts does not reflect true price reductions at all, but only a con-
cession off a threatened price that is higher than the prices that would have pre-
vailed absent the monopolist’s demand for bundling. This assumption frames
much of Elhauge’s “power effects” arguments about bundled discounts.
The central problem with Elhauge’s argument is that the monopolist cannot
obtain much leverage by demanding a price above its profit-maximizing monop-
oly price. Unless the monopolist has been engaging in some form of limit pric-
ing,15 it has already priced the monopoly product at the level that makes any fur-
ther price increase unprofitable. Consequently, any threatened price increase on
the monopoly product to punish the buyer for failing to purchase the package
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would inflict costs on the seller as well as the buyer. The threat to raise the
“tying” product’s price thus lacks credibility.
Suppose, for example, that the dominant firm enjoys a monopoly over Product
A but faces competition for Product B. The profit-maximizing monopoly price
for Product A is $10 and the marginal cost of Product B—which is also the price
prevailing in the competitive market—is $5. The dominant firm would ordinar-
ily sell the AB combination for $15. Suppose it seeks to leverage its market
power from Product A to Product B. Under Elhauge’s approach, the dominant
firm could obtain a price above $15 by threatening to increase the price of
Product A to, say, $12 if buyers refused to pay, say, and $16 for an AB package.
But since $10 was the profit-maximizing monopoly price of A, it would be
unprofitable for the dominant firm to raise the price to $12. At $12, the domi-
nant firm would face elastic demand and unprofitably lose sales. Hence, the
threat to raise price to $12 would be a hollow one, since it would be as unprof-
itable for the seller as for the buyer.
One might respond that raising the monopoly price above the profit-maximiz-
ing level is simply another form of profit sacrifice that monopolists might utilize
to discipline the market. Like below-cost pricing, such unprofitably high pricing
might allow the monopolist to exclude rivals or engage in wealth-transferring
price discrimination strategies which would, in turn, permit the monopolist to
recoup the costs of its unprofitable pricing campaign.16
But, if below-cost pricing strategies are risky propositions for the monopolist,
above-profit maximizing pricing strategies are even more so. When a predator
lowers its price below its cost, it expands output, enlarges its market share, steals
customers from its rivals, and often brings new customers into the market. One
of the reasons that it is difficult to distinguish predatory pricing from pro-com-
petitive promotional pricing is that, even in a
competitive market, temporary aggressive price-
cutting may have long-run benefits for the
price-cutter if it is able to build customer loyal-
ty in its expanded share of the market. Also,
expanding the dominant firm’s market share
may boost its status and prestige in the market.
Even if the price-cutting is truly predatory in
the sense that the dominant firm would not
have undertaken such a strategy unless it expected to be able to recoup its lost
profits in a less-competitive market, the enhanced market share and its loyalty-
building and status-building effects may be silver linings in the event the preda-
tory campaign fails.
Pricing above the profit-maximizing price is just the opposite. The dominant
firm must now cede sales to rivals. Those rivals obtain short-run benefits as their
own market share expands and may also enjoy the long-run customer loyalty and
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prestige enhancements that a predator experiences. Although the supra-monop-
oly price need only continue long enough to coerce customers to accept the bun-
dle, that may be long enough to shift the market dynamics in favor of rivals. It is
unlikely that many firms would frequently run such a risk. If there is one thing
that makes sales executives nervous, it is the prospect of their customers experi-
menting with a rival’s product.
We anticipate three objections to this line of argument. First, some may object
that the monopolist over Product A does not have to fear diversion of sales to
rivals since, by definition, there are no rivals for Product A. But this argument
misconceives the nature of competition in two ways. First, a monopoly does not
have to mean a 100 percent market share. The dominant firm may very well face
some limited competition within the relevant market and those competitors may
be positioned to expand production in the event of further price increases by the
dominant firm.
There is an even more fundamental economic point. A monopolist’s profit-
maximizing price occurs in the elastic portion of the demand curve. The reason
that any further price increase would be unprofitable is that the marginal cus-
tomers would begin switching to other products if the defendant increased its
price. Hence, by increasing its price above the profit-maximizing level, the
defendant would be inviting its customers to divert purchases to adjacent prod-
ucts that were not previously in direct competition with the monopolist’s prod-
uct. In effect, the monopolist’s price increase would be encouraging its customers
to consider substitutes for the monopolist’s product. Most sales managers would
not want to run the risk of their customers experimenting with new products and
deciding they prefer them to the monopolist’s product.
A second line of objection would follow the game theoretic literature on
predatory pricing that suggests that dominant firms do not have to incur the
costs of actual predatory pricing if they can
obtain a reputation as predators and, hence,
deter entry by threatening predation.17 Perhaps
the monopolist could occasionally discipline a
customer who rejects its bundled offer by raising
the stand-alone monopoly price and thereby
obtain a reputation as a punitive seller. As Frank
Easterbrook demonstrated several decades ago,
there are reasons to be skeptical about reputa-
tional theories in single-product predation.18 There are even more reasons to be
skeptical of such a theory when the threat is directed at customers rather than
rivals. It is one thing to develop a reputation as a punisher of rivals and quite
another to develop a reputation as a punisher of customers. Monopolists do not
depend on the good will of their rivals, but they do depend on the good will of
their customers.
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Finally, one might object that dominant firms can threaten a supra-monopoly
price because the customers will not know that it will harm the monopolist.
However, informational asymmetries between the buyer and seller are unlikely
to allow the seller to bluff the buyer into believing the threat. The buyer has as
much information as the seller about its demand elasticity. The buyer knows that
at the threatened higher price point it will simply begin substituting other prod-
ucts and that the seller will therefore experi-
ence pain as well if it follows through on its
threat. The buyer thus has a strong counter-
threat to the seller’s threat.
We do not claim that a monopolist could
never coerce customers to accept a bundle by
threatening a supra-monopoly price on the
tying product. We are simply skeptical that this would happen often enough to
craft legal rules designed to prevent it. In the push-and-pull between Chicago
and post-Chicago theories, the issue again comes down to evidence.19 Post-
Chicago has not yet made the case that supra-monopoly pricing threats are a
realistic or frequent occurrence.
III. Bundled Discounts as True Discounts
In order to be considered a tying arrangement, bundled discounts would have to
coerce buyers to forego their preferred buying patterns.20 If such disguised tying
occurs, it is surely in a small percentage of all bundled discounting cases. Bundled
discounting is pervasive across competitive markets where market power is not
conceivably present and where the practice therefore cannot be coercive.
Further, bundled discounts that represent the transmission of savings from
economies of scale or scope—which is often the case—are not coercive even in
imperfectly competitive markets. Elhauge would permit a cost-justification
defense akin to that allowed for commodity price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act.21
While such justifications should clearly be allowed if bundled discounts are
held to be potentially anticompetitive, the post-Chicago School’s focus on the
buyer’s motivations and justifications for bundled discounting schemes often
misses the mark. For, in many cases, the buyer rather than the seller initiates the
bundled discount scheme, or the buyer and the seller are equally in favor of the
contract’s bundled pricing structure.
Why would a buyer enter into a contract that made its favorable pricing
options contingent upon minimum purchase volumes across multiple product
lines? The answer is that the buyer may leverage its buying power across multi-
ple product lines in order to obtain more favorable pricing. Hence, contrary to
post-Chicago assertions that bundled discounting is not a true price reduction,
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buyer-initiated bundled discounting is often an essential feature in a buyer’s strat-
egy to lower procurement costs.
The formal analysis of buyer-initiated bundled discounting follows Klein &
Murphy’s analysis of retailer-initiated exclusive shelf-space contracts.22 In Klein &
Murphy’s model, firms compete for preferred distribution from retailers relative to
rival products. The preferred method of distribution often involves retailer exclusiv-
ity- or partial exclusivity-commitments in exchange for compensation from manu-
facturers, such as wholesale price discounts, slotting fees, or even cash payments.23
There are two fundamental economic questions raised by this form of compe-
tition. The first is whether there is a pro-competitive explanation for the pur-
chase of preferred distribution or exclusivity.24 The second is whether payment in
the form of a discount, in this case a bundled discount, is efficient.25 We focus on
the first question here.26 The retailers are able to obtain lower prices (or the
equivalent) from manufacturers because, by committing that all of their cus-
tomers will purchase a single brand within the relevant product category (spices,
for example), the retailer elasticizes the demand facing the manufacturer.27 The
retailer essentially acts as its customers’ bargaining agent, committing the cus-
tomers to buy in a block instead of picking based on brand preference at the
point of sale.28 Customers lose variety but obtain lower prices.29
A similar analysis applies to buyer offers to purchase minimum volumes of a
product from a diversified seller across the seller’s various product lines. In a cost-
free world, the buyer would prefer to pick and choose its brands on a product-by-
product basis. However, the buyer might also prefer a price reduction to the
option to maintain brand variety. By combining multiple products into a single
package purchase, the buyer can credibly signal to the seller that it is foregoing
its product variety preferences in exchange for a lower price. By jettisoning its
individual variety preferences (or, to disaggregate the buyer, the variety prefer-
ences of the purchasing of separate product pur-
chasers within a large organization), the buyer
effectively elasticizes the demand facing the sell-
er and can thereby drive the price lower.
Unlike Elhauge’s model of threatened supra-
monopoly prices, there are abundant real-world
examples of buyers pursuing bundled discount-
ing schemes. Consider, for example, the federal
government’s procurement guidelines on bundling. The guidelines contemplate
that federal government buyers may consider making solicitations for bundled
contracts in order to lower the price of the acquired goods or services.30 The
guidelines recognize that bundling may have adverse effects on small businesses
and therefore requires a finding that the bundling would have “measurably sub-
stantial benefits.”31 These include “cost savings or price reductions,” “quality
improvements that will save time or improve or enhance performance or effi-
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ciency,” “reduction in acquisition cycle times,” “better terms and conditions,”
and “any other benefits.”32 These “measurably substantial benefits” must general-
ly equal 10 percent of the estimated contract value for contracts worth $75 mil-
lion or less and at least 5 percent or $7.5 million (whichever is greater) for con-
tracts worth more than $75 million.33 In sum, the federal government’s procure-
ment guidelines call for federal buyers to solicit substantial discounts for enter-
ing into bundled contracts.
Similarly, medical supply Group Purchasing Organizations (“GPOs”) and
Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBMs”) employ bundled discount strategies to
drive prices lower on behalf of their constituencies (usually hospitals and insur-
ance companies).34 Elhauge’s argument that “[b]uyers face a collective action
problem that requires a collective action solution through antitrust law”35 misses
the point that GPOs, PBMs, and other buyer cooperatives that strategically
employ bundled discounts are organized precisely in order to solve a collective
action problem. By collectively committing to trade variety for lower prices, the
purchasing organization prevents the seller from exploiting the individual mem-
bers’ variety preferences to obtain higher prices.
While the previous examples have generally focused on power buyers, a signif-
icant implication of Klein & Murphy’s model is that the buyer’s ability to elasti-
cize the demand facing the seller and hence obtain lower prices does not depend
on the buyer having monopsonistic power.36 Hence, even relatively powerless
buyers facing relatively powerful sellers may have the ability to bargain for lower
prices by committing to purchasing multiple products. Far from being a seller-
side power tool, bundled discounting may be a buyer-side power tool.
We do not claim that customer-initiated bundled discount schemes are uni-
formly beneficial to end consumers. Customer-initiated exclusive dealing may be
of greater concern when the customer resells the product downstream and is thus
capable of passing on any overcharge imposed by the seller.37 Some intermediate
buyers may tolerate bundled discounts that increase their own profitability even
if the long-run effects of such discounts are to exclude competitors and thereby
increase prices to end consumers. But that only means that the proper focus on
bundled discount law should remain exclusion of rivals. While bundled discounts
are not often exclusionary,38 the possibility that they are disguised predatory dis-
counts—not that they are disguised price increases—should be the focus of the
antitrust inquiry.
IV. Conclusion
Professor Elhauge has written a thoughtful and important article that challenges
the consensus that seemed to be emerging around a discount attribution test for
bundled discounts. Nonetheless, his creative arguments rest on flawed assump-
tions. Bundled discounts generally benefit consumers and only harm them in the
Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?
Competition Policy International218
narrow set of circumstances where they exclude rivals. “Power effects” should not
be a concern of bundled discounting law. In future work, we will address other
aspects of his paper.
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